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This article studies the inequalities in measurements of the risk aversion in the context of the financial investments in 
Tunisia. We clarify initially the factors constitutive of the risk aversion. The studied actors are individual decision makers. The 
tackled questions are the risk attitude (including the risks known as extremes), its perception, its evaluation, the 
decision-making in risky universe. The empirical data were collected through experimental sessions carried out in Tunisia.   
We propose a framework of analysis for the study of the investors’ preferences based on an operational econometric 
modeling. The estimated models are the ordered probit and the ordered probit with random effects. The model with random 
effects has the advantage of making it possible to test the heterogeneity of the individuals and to measure the inequality in 
risk aversion of the investors, and this, by studying the components between and within-individual of the variance of the risk 
aversion.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The study of the financial sector and analysis of the behaviors of the individuals who work, arouse today an interest growing 
of partly with the recent trends in the capital market (see Eeckhoudt, Gollier and al., 2005; Gollier, 2001). Although the 
aversion with risk is a key factor, determining the investors’ behavior is difficult to rigorously measure the risk aversion in the 
context of financial investments. Indeed, the risk aversion is expressed according to two dimensions, one economic related 
to the liquidity or the stability of the income, the other subjective one expressed the psychological aptitude of the investor to 
be lost (see Broihanne, Merli and Roger, 2004; Step, 2005). One of the principal difficulties in the measurement of aversion 
to the risk is related to its subjective nature that can be measured only by using the questionnaires trying to capture the 
determining elements in the investors’ behavior.  
The majority of the evaluation methods of the risk aversion developed at the present time rest on models, which expressly 
suppose a linearity between dependent variable and explanatory variables. Such models cannot be adequate since one 
takes account of subjective nature of risk aversion. In practice, the approach most used by the financial intermediaries is that 
of the scoring
3
 question. The financial institutions proposeto their customers a small number (from 3 to 6) of standard 
wallets, which are positioned along a one-dimensional scale of risk. An optimal position corresponds to the minimization of 
the average of the cost for the investors who do not have access to a wallet entirely personalized (see of Palma and Prigent; 
2008).   
Our analysis exceeds the existing literature on the estimate of risk aversion by proposing an approach that combines at the 
same time the techniques of experimental economy (of the questions of the lotteries type based on the risky and nonrisky 
credits and questions related to the attitudes) (see of Palma and Picard 2002, 2005) and the flexibility of  discrete  choice 
models (see Anderson, of Palma and Thisse, 1992; McFadden, 2001; Ben-Akiva, McFadden and of Palma 2003). Indeed, 
there is an immense dissymmetry between analysis of the purely financial risk aversion (cognitive process) and econometric 
analysis. Our approach is compatible at the same time with the expected utility theory (see Von Neumann and Mogenster, 
1947) and non-expected utility theory (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Within the 
framework of non-expected theory, we use for our problems to cumulated prospects theory (CPT), proposed by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1992)
4
. In addition, certain researches developed estimate of risk aversion comparable with that used in this 
work, but which are applicable either within the framework of expected utility theory (see Hartog, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and 
Jonketand, 2000), or within the framework non-expected utility theory (see Donkers, Melenberg and van Soest; 2000).  
However, several work tried to extend the models of existing choices, in a choice model which stresses the fact that the 
choice is controlled by perceptions. These models treat also heterogeneity through the decision makers like the various 
attitudes and perceptions and of significant latent constructions due to the perceptions influenced by psychological factors 
and external constraints, Train and McFadden (2000), Green (2002). Thus, the latent factors provide a richer behavioral 
representation process of choice and the addition of the tastes of heterogeneity improves the explanatory power of the 
model. Key contribution is the development of the model of choice, whose results of estimate show that the individuals differ 
in their risk attitudes. From where, considerable interest to model explicitly heterogeneity.  
In this article, we lay down a double objective: we propose another manner of generalizing the canonical model of expected 
utility as well as the model of non-expected utility. This extension leaves the following observation: if we put the same 
questionwith an individual, or a series of questions logically related to the same individual, we generally observe a dispersion 
of answers around an average answer. Typically, the same individual confronted with identical conditions will answer 
differently to the same questions during different occasions. The classical expected utility theory, or the non-expected utility 
theory, is not able to give an account of this simple observation (see for example Pfiffelman, 2008). We can argue that 
individuals learn, or although a certain tiredness settles or that there are effects of context. But, another answer is possible. 
It consists in regarding these variations of behaviors as errors, present in any collect data. This taking into explicit account of 
errors, from the start at the theoretical level, seems significant to us. To give an account of these deviations to the behaviors 
of the economic theory, we propose to introduce second source of heterogeneity into the population. Indeed, there is an 
unobserved heterogeneity of the tastes in the population: the parameters of the variables are not invariants with the sampled 
individual. Also homogeneous is the sample, the relations of preferences subjacent with the levels of utility of the individuals 
cannot be strictly identical.  
The originality of this extension is as it applies as well to the expected utility model as with the non-expected utility 
model.Thus try to extend the methodology of estimate of Palma and Picard (2005), by introducing the heterogeneity of 
individuals (see Barsky et al., 1997), by having recourse to the panel techniques to estimate how the risk aversion varies at 
the same time between individuals and, for the same individual, for several situations of choice. More precisely, we 
proposeto relax the restrictive assumption of the unicity of the behavioral parameters on the whole of investors. Minks to 
bring an additional lighting on the role of individual heterogeneity in the measurement of the risk aversion.  
In order to control this individual heterogeneity, we carry out a survey which measures and quantifies individual reactions to 
the situations where risk relates to the financial investment. We measure risk aversion of the same individual face to several 
situations of choice. In risk aversion, there is a part specific to the investor when he carries out his choices while the other 
part refers to the context of choice (proper to the lotteries series), to see for example Pfiffelman and Roger(2005). In two 
different contexts, the same individual makes different choices. We pose to the same individual several series of lotteries, in 
order to recall the risk aversion of the same individual for various levels of risk, different rising and various durations from 
investments. We try to measure the inequality in investors’ risk aversion by applying a panel model, namely the random 
effects probit ordered model (see Chamberlain, 1984; Hedeker and Gibbons, 1994), which is one of methodologies 
generally adopted to consider variables dependent, having a natural order in data of panel (see Ben-Akiva and al, 2001; 
                                                 
3
total score is the sum of the scores obtained with each 
4
results on the test of the theory of utility are not matter of this article 
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Walker and Ben-Akiva, 2002; Ben-Akiva, McFadden and of Palma, 2008; Ben-Akiva and al., 1999). This study aims at 
testing the heterogeneity of the individuals. Indeed, we can use the models of panel, as soon as there are several 
observations for same individual, even if they are collected at the sametime (during an experimental session). We consider 
two dimensions then: the individual i  and the series of lottery k . Such are the questions, which we try to answer: what 
does it occur, if we pose to the same individual two series of different lotteries? Does the random effects always improve the 
explanatory power of the model? In addition, is there heterogeneity between individuals? If so, how is the significance of 
explanatory variables affected by non-observables heterogeneity individuals?   
The second objective of our article consists in measuring the inequality of risk aversion in the context of financial investments 
by using the models of panel. Indeed, understand the relative importance of the differences between and within individual of 
risk aversion is crucial. The impact of individual on his choices depends on the characteristics of within and between 
individual. However, we know little on the relative magnitudes of inequalities will within and between individual in the risk 
aversion. Consequently, our interest is carried to the components will within and between individual of risk aversion, still very 
little explored within the framework specific of our research. With this intention, we carry out a variance analysis on random 
effects ordered probit model. Our analysis consists of a decomposition of the variance of dependent variable on individual 
risk aversion, in within and between-individual components of the observable and non-observable components. We will try to 
estimate the components of the variances within and between individual. In order to study the stability of the individuals’ risk 
aversion of a series to another.  
This article arises as follows: the first section will be devoted to the presentation of data of experimental economics of our 
sample followed by descriptive statistics. The econometric model and its proprietieswill be discussed in the second section. 
The third section present the results of the estimate of the random effects ordered probit ordered model on experimental 
tunisian sample: we will start by testing the heterogeneity of the individuals in the sample, then we carry out a comparison 
between results of the estimate of the model with and without random effects, in order to study the improvement made by the 
random effects on the explanatory power of the model. Lastly, we carry out a variance analysis will within and 
between-individualin order to measure the individuals’ inequality in risk aversion. 
 
1. DESCRIPTIVE DATA AND STATISTICS 
1.1 Presentation of the data: experimental protocol  
In the context of the experimental economy, we developed an experimental laboratory, the first in Tunisia, on the evaluation 
of the individual risk aversion in the context of the financial investments (see Brook and Zank, 2004; Goeree, Holt and 
Palfrey, 2003; Holt and Laury, 2003; Luce, 2000; Roth, 1988; Holt, 2006). We conducted experiments
5
 in a guided and 
controlled way which measured and quantified the individual reactions towards situations where the risk was on the financial 
investment. Respondent were encouraged to provide sincere answers with a remuneration related to their answers. Indeed, 
the choices of the individuals determine their earnings. The financing of our experimental sessions was assured by the 
French National Agency of Research (ANR). The experiments were conducted at the Business school of Tunis, in a 
computer room equipped of broadband Internet so as to get easily connected the site www.RiskToleranceOnLine.com. 
However, we adapted the questionnaire of the Web site to the Tunisian context (reference currency, adapting the invested 
amounts in dinars Tunisian diplomas, … 
The experimental sessions were held from February 2012 to April 2012. Given the planned treatments, 30 experimental 
sessions; each including between 9 and 15 subjects were conducted. The average duration of the experiments was 
approximately 1h30mn. The subjects were mainly students of second degree in economic sciences, finance, the teaching 
and administrative staff of the universities. We collected 386 respondents, during this experimental laboratory. Each 
participant responded to 10 series of lotteries. During each session, the subjects made choices to ten series of lotteries. In 
addition, they were informed of the number of sets of lotteries to be filled. The only modifications among the series of the 
lotteries game were the return laws of the lotteries and the interval where its returns vary. In the first three series (series 1 to 
3) the return followed the uniform law, whereas series 4 to 6 the return followed a symmetric binary law. These six series 
included negative return in order to measure the asymmetry around zero. However, in the series 7 and the 8, the outputs had 
a small probability of large loss, whereas in series 9 and 10, the return had a small Jackpot probability. The figure (1) shows 
the decision tree of lotteries. The monetary incentives werevaried according to individual choices. Starting with an initial 
equal amount for all the respondents that are 30 Tunisian dinars, the final remuneration consisted of the amount that was 
multiplied by the return corresponding to the choice, which was made, on one of the 10 series of lotteries randomly drawn. 
The choice of the initial monetary values took into account several potentially contradictory constraints. We carefully 
selected this initial amount by resorting to excavated pilot studies (with about fifteen subjects). To be remunerated, the 
individual randomly drew a number between 1 and 10 that corresponded to the series determining his gain.  
 
                                                 
5
Experiment is a whole of sessions are in controlled environment. 
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Figure 1. Representation of decision problem. 
 
The incentives are monetary and vary according to choices of the individual. On the basis of an identical initial amount for all 
the candidates 30 dinars Tunisian, final remuneration is this rising multiplied by the output corresponding to the choice which 
it made on one of the 10 series of randomly drawn lotteries. The choice of the initial money values took account of several 
potentially contradictory constraints. We carefully selected this starting amount while resorting to excavated pilot studies 
(with about fifteen subjects). Obviously, only the individuals who finished the questionnaire will be remunerated. Indeed, 
after having answered the 10 series of lotteries, a summary table 
6
 taking again the questions and answers of the 
individuals will be posted.  
More precisely, to pay the individuals, we make draw the individual randomly a number between 1 and 10 correspondent 
with the series, which determines its profit:  
 If the series number drawn randomly, corresponds to a series in the which individual carried out a certain 
choice, then remuneration is the rising basic one (30 Dinars Tunisian) multiplied by the certain return rate which 
chooses at the time thisseries.  
 But, if the serie number drawn randomly, corresponds to a series in the which individual make a risked 
choice, whose output follows an equiprobable binary law (series 4, 5 and 6). It is necessary to launch a coin. If it 
falls on pile, we multiply the negative output by the basic amount and if it falls on face, we multiply the positive 
rendement by the basic amount.  
 In addition, if the series number randomly drawn, whose return is uniform (series 1, 2 and 3), it is 
necessary to proceed as follows: let us suppose that the uniform return one between -5% and 20%, it is necessary 
to make it draw a paper in a ballot box containing from paper written -5%, -4.5%,  , 19%, 19.5%, 20%. The return 
drawn one from the ballot box is multiplied by the basic amount.  
 Finally, if the series number drawn corresponds to a return with a small probability of large loss or Jackpot 
(series 7 to 10). It is necessary to proceed as follows: let us suppose for example that candidate choose a lottery 
with 5% of chances to have -20% and 95% of chances to have +10%. It is necessary that the individual draw a 
paper in a ballot box containing 19 papers write "max" and 1 paper written "min". If it draws the min, it receives -20% 
to multiply by the basic amount and if it draws max, it receives 10% to multiply by the basic amount.  
However, for series 7 to 10, the probabilities of weak loss or jackpot vary from a lottery to another for the same individual and 
the yields vary from one individual to another.   
We present in the tables (1) and (2), the exhaustive lists of all the probabilities concerned, those of the lotteries with weak 
probability of large loss and those of the lotteries with weak probability of jackpot, as well as the number of papers "min" and 
"max" to put in the ballot box in each case. We will sweep all the alternatives, allowing remunerating the individuals.  
 
                                                 
6
this table is posted for individuals who were connectedto the centres of the experimental laboratory 
only (with a word of pass particluier which the experimenter, introduced at the beginning of the 
experiment) and which obviously answered the 10 series. 
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1.2 Descriptive statistics 
According to summarize the statistics (see table 3) of variables in the sample, we found that the sample was homogeneous 
in nature. Indeed, it consisted of 51.14% men. The average age was 27.341 years. Specifically, 87.33% of the population is 
at an age less than 25 and 10.22% of the respondents had an age between 26 and 40 years. However, the most common 
marital status was the single one with 73.33% while the married represented only 18.92% in the sample. Moreover, 59.26% 
of the respondents considered themselves as novices, 29.39% rather experienced, 10.35% and 1.00% experienced and 
very experienced. The primary objective of investment is for 4.90% of respondents to leave a legacy, 4.17% for training, 
2.47% for saving for retirement,11.10% for constructing a safety mattress, 17.92% to generate long-term revenue, 16.22% 
to generate regular income, 20.09% for buying or renovating a house, 13.20% for durable goods purchases and 1.67% to 
grow their wealth. Other goals are so less likely that they can be broadly represented as a secondary objective. Regarding 
the style of investors, 8.82% of respondents accept no fluctuations, 28.02% of respondents accept short-term fluctuations, 
53.44% of respondents accept moderate fluctuations and 9.72% of respondents accept significant fluctuations. During a 
period of rise and after loss, 26.07% of the respondent paid immediately, 54.63% waited a turnaround and 22.39% kept 
rising. However, 19.65% of respondents have already invested, 21.97% of respondents intend to reallocate some of their 
capital share in order to achieve their goal, 58.39% of respondents intend to gradually build capital in the coming years in 
order to achieve their main goal, while 0.13% did not intend to invest. After a high loss, 26.07% of respondents immediately 
liquidate. 54.63% of respondents expect turning. Finally, 22.39% of respondents continue. However, following a decline, 
26.32% of investors immediately liquidate. 43.01% of respondents liquidate after significant loss. Similarly, 30.67% of 
respondents remain and accept all the changes. However, 45.00% of respondents have inheritance. While 24.14% of 
respondents did not real estate. More than half of the sample has less than a year of investment experience. 32.97% of 
respondents chose a time horizon of 5 years. The average horizon reported by respondents is 10.333 years. Each 
respondent made three successive choices. The distribution of responses from individuals to sets of lotteries, summarized in 
Table (4), shows that the percentage of respondents in the category of less risk averse "RRR" is higher than the percentage 
of the most risk-averse "SSS". We can say that a priori, individuals are most likely to be very sunny or very careful players.  
 
2. ECONOMETRIC MODEL: RANDOM EFFECTS ORDERED PROBIT MODEL 
When we observe population N  decision makers presumably independent and identical, placed toward the same whole of 
choice between lotteries, emerges unobservable problems of heterogeneity of the preferences. Part of each 
decision-making process remains unquantifiable, and must be considered as random by the modelisator.  
However, because of effect of framing or lack of concentration or others, the individual answers to a series of lotteries return 
sometimes to a disturbed vision of the individual aversion to the risk Manki (1977). The application of the techniques of panel 
to the models of discrete choice will make it possible to gum these noises. According to Palma and Picard (2002), the results 
obtained from students show that the variations of the risk to the risk for the same individual reacting to various risky 
situations are of the same order of magnitude as the variations of the average aversion to the risk individual of the various 
respondents.  
As the aversion to the risk is a qualitative variable ordered, we consider the random effects ordered probit model, where 
there is an additional error normally distributed through the individuals. We propose to the guarantors 10 series of 3 lotteries, 
and we use techniques of panel to estimate the way in which the aversion with the risk varies at the same time between 
individuals and, for the same individual, of a series of lotteries to the other.  
2.1Definition of the model  
The random effects ordered probit model, is written:  
 1 1ik ik iky x i N k K 
              (1) 
 
iky

: the latent variable non observed interpreted like the risk aversion in the investment. The analyst observes, iky  who 
takes the values {0 1 }m    according to the position relating of 
iky

 relative to a whole of ordered thresholds:  
 
0 1
1 2
1
0 y 0
1 if
2 if
...
(2)
ik
ik
ik
ik
m ik
if
y
y
y
m if y
 
 






  

  

  
 

   


 
where, iky  measure the risk aversion (standardized, ordinal) of individual i  when it answers the series k ,  
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i : represent the individual investor 1i N    
k : represent the series of lotteries filled by the investor 1k K   .  
ikx  : is the set of the whole explanatory variables specific to the individual i  and the series of lottery k  (these variables 
depend not only on individual i  and its project of investment, but also of the series k  of lotteries concerned).   
 : Vectors of the parameters to be estimated.  
2.2 Assumptions of the model 
The random term ik is written as sum of individual term iu  and a residual term ik  according to a centered normal law 
reduced and varying independently from one series to another for the same individual:  
 ik ik iu    (3) 
 
where iu  :term corresponding to heterogeneity non observed for the individual i , presumably random and independently 
distributed ikx . We suppose that iu follows
2(0 )uN  , where 
2
u  is to be estimated   
ik : Normally distributed random term, corresponding to the errors of measurement specific to the series of lotteries.   
Following the problem of identification, we suppose
2 1  , from where ik follows (0 1)N  .   
We preserve under a condition of orthogonally of the disturbances with the random parameters of taste, simple formulations 
of the probabilities of ordered probitmoddel obtained under assumption of independence and identicity of the disturbances, 
while generating the existence of unobservable correlations between the various options of choice: 
 ( ) 0 ( ) 0 ( ) 0ik i ik jE \ X E u \ X cov u \ X i k j           (4) 
 
 
 
( ) 1 i j et k s
( )
0
ik
ik js
var if
cov
otherwise

 
   
  
 
                                                           (5) 
 
 
2( ) i j
( )
0
i u
i j
var u if
cov u u
otherwise
   
  
 
                                                            (6)                       
 
where X : represent all the exogenic data of the sample, ikx iandk .   
Consequently, the within-individual variance of the non-explained component is standardized with one, whereas the 
between-individual variance of the not explained component is noted
2
u . Therefore, the term of random error total ik  is:  
 
2
2 2 2
2
( ) 0 ( ) 1 ( )
1
u
ik ik u u ik is
u
E \ X var corr

       

         

 (7) 
 
 
Although the errors iu  and ik  are supposed to be independent between them and of the explanatory variables ikx , the 
term of random error total ik  of the various series k  for the same individual i  is correlated due at thecommon run iu . 
However, this modeling is slightly different from that generally used. Indeed, 1  is standardized to zero and the constant is 
included in the list of the redressers. Here, the constant is equal to zero and estimate 1
7
.  
 
1 1( 0 ) ( ) ( )ik ik i ik ik i ik iP y \ x u P y \ x u x u  
         (8) 
 
 
 1 2( 1 ) ( )ik ik i ik ik iP y \ x u P y \ x u 
       (9) 
 
                                                 
7
this choice is arbitrary and equivalent to the paremtrisation of Green(2002) 
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2 1( ) ( )ik i ik ix u x u          
 ( ) ( ) 1 ( )ik ik i ik m ik i m ik iP y m\ x u P y \ x u x u  
          (10) 
 
 
2.3 Properties and identification of the model 
The function of log-likelihood is written:  
 
1 2
1
ln( ( ))
n
i i iK
i
L P y y y

      (11) 
 
 
where while simply generalizing the argument of Butler and Moffitt (1982),  
 
1
1
1 2 1 1( ) ( )
i iK
i iK
b b
i i iK i iT iK i
a a
P y y y d d               (12) 
 
 
 
1[ ( ) ( )]
K
k ik i ik i ib \u a \u du



     
 
 
1( [ ( ) ( )]) ( )
N
i ki i ki i ib u a ui u du



       
with
 
1ik j ika x 

   et 
 
ik j ikb x 

  , if iky j , where 1    and 8   .  
Knowing that : 
 
1 2 1( ) [ ( ) ( )]
N
i i iK ik i ki i kiP y y y b u a ui            (13) 
 
 
3. INDIVIDUALS HETEROGENEITY AND RANDOM EFFECTS 
3.1 Results  
The random effect ordered probit model is estimated by the log-likelihood function introduced by Butler and Moffitt (1982) 
and the method of squaring of Gauss-Hermit in agreement with the structure of the model for random effects. The version of 
Stata 8.2provides the order "reoprob", developed by Frechette (2001) to estimate the random effects ordered probit model, 
summarized in table (5).  
To test the random effects, we examine the statistical significanceof  , by using the statistical test of Wald (
2
2S
w

 ). If 
2w   critics value (3.84 for a criticizes level of 95%), we reject the nullity of 0rho   (Green, 2002). Like,
2
21
( ) u
u
ik iscorr


  

   , if the random effect exists, then ik  and is  is correlated for the same individual i , but not 
correlated through the individuals. However, if the random effects are not significant, 
2 0u  and 
2
2(1 )
0u
u




  , which 
indicates that there is no correlation between the series of lotteries according to ik , for the same individual.   
During the estimate of the random effects ordered probit model in the tunisian sample (see table 5), we found a   with a 
significant coefficient with the threshold of 1%. Therefore, there is well heterogeneity between the individuals of the 
Tunisiansample. Moreover we carried out a test of Wald with 
2
2 3 84w



    for a criticize level of 95%, we reject the 
nullity of 0   (Green, 2002). Consequently, there is a significant effect of heterogeneity between the individuals of the 
Tunisian sample. Therefore, there is a correlation between the series of lotteries for the same individual, but not through the 
individuals of the Tunisian sample.   
In the table of estimate of a random effects ordered probit model (table 5), only the sign of the variables indicates in which 
direction the probability changes.  
 Results presented show that the explanatory variable "woman" is non-significant in the Tunisian sample, 
with the conventional threshold of 10%. This result not converging with certain results of the existing literature (see 
Jorg, 2003) but converges with others (see Brachinberg et al., 1999; Chattopadhyay and Duflo; 2004). Thus, the 
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kind is not a factor determining of the risk aversion in the context of the financial investments in the Tunisian 
sample.  
In addition, several variables influence with the rise the probability that the aversion with the risk increases. Precisely: 
 dummy relating to the age of the individual, only the variable "age2" corresponding to the investors whose 
age is between 26 and 40 years, influences with the rise the probability that the risk aversion increases, with a 
coefficient positive andsignificant with the threshold of 1 % compared to the category of reference "age1" 
corresponding to the investors whose age is less than 25 years. However, the variables "age3" and "age4" are 
nonsignificant with the conventional threshold of 10%.  
 in the same way, all explanatory variables representing the style of the investor "investstyle2" which do not 
accept any fluctuation and "investstyle3" relating to that which accepts that fluctuations of short durations are 
favorable also to theprobability of increase in the risk aversion with coefficients positive and significant with the 
common threshold of 1% compared to the category of reference "investstyle5" corresponding to the investor who 
accepts even the significant fluctuations, while the other variables in the model are supposed to be constant. 
However, the dummy "investstyle4" representing the investors who accept that moderate fluctuations is 
non-significant with the conventional threshold of 10%.  
 variables representing types of lotteries in the questionnaire, are such as the dummy "lottype2", "lottype3" 
and "lottype4" corresponds respectively to the law of the uniform, binary lottery equiprobable and a small probability 
of great profit, is an increasing function of the risk aversion and with positive and significant coefficients with the 
common threshold of 1% compared to the category of reference "lottype5" corresponding to the lottery of weak 
probability of Jackpot, while the other variables in the model are supposed to be constant. 
 In the same way, the variable representing the type of transformation of the lotteries individual faces at the 
time of his choice is: "Addmult1" transformations additive, is significantly different compared to the category of 
reference "addmult2" indicating that the transformation of the lottery is multiplicative, with a positive and significant 
coefficient with the threshold of 5%. This results in the fact that the additive transformations of the lotteries influence 
with the rise the probability that the aversion increases, while the other variables in the model are supposed to be 
constant.  
 Variable "lambdaAdd" representing the additive scale effects is significant with the threshold of 5%, with a 
positive coefficient. This result indicates that the "lambdaAdd" influence with the falls the probability that the risk 
aversion increases, while the other variables in the model are supposed to be constant. Moreover, the variable 
"lamdaMult" is significant with also positive coefficients with the threshold of 1%.  
On the other hand, the assumption of convergence is also supported by negative coefficients of the following variables:  
 Objective of the investment is important to determine the individual risk aversion. Indeed, for "obj6" 
representing the objective to build a mattress of safety. The other objectives are non-significant with the 
conventional threshold of 10%.  
 In addition, an original result 
8
is obtained. It consists so that the married respondents are less risk averse. 
Indeed, the dummy "matri1" relating to the married individuals is significantly different from the category of 
reference "matri7" that of the single people, with negative coefficient and significant with the threshold of 10%. 
However, the variables "matri5", "matri6" and "matri8" respectively representing the individuals divorced, widowed 
and in couples but nonmarried are non-significant with the conventional thresholds of 10%.   
Lastly, the variable "Dummyinvestcapital" representing individuals having chosen capital to less invest an amount than 
50000 Euros, the variables representing the behavior of the investor after a loss, "lossbehave2" indicate that the investor 
liquidates immediately after a loss, "lossbehave3" corresponding to the investor which liquidates only after significant loss, 
"losswinsbehave2" corresponding to the investor which liquidates immediately and "losswinsbehave3" corresponding to the 
investor who awaits reversal after a loss, are no significant with the conventional threshold of 10%, when the other variables 
in the model are supposed to be constant. 
Finally, we note that all the thresholds are positive and significant with the thresholds of 1%, except for the first threshold.  
3.2 Discussion of the random effects 
After testing the heterogeneity of the individuals, moved by the will to study the impact of the latter on our model, we ask 
ourselves the following questions: does the random effects always improve the explanatory power of the model? In addition, 
how is the significance of the explanatory variables affected by unobservable heterogeneity of the individuals? To answer 
these questions, we will compare the level of significance of the variables and their signs, in the two estimates with and 
withoutrandom effects. We compare the tables of the results of estimate of the random effects ordered probit model 
presented in the table (5) and that of ordered probit model presented in the table (6)
9
. We note that the model probit ordered 
with random effects in the Tunisian sample, improves the statistics of Log likelihood. Indeed, the results of statistics of the 
probability of notation are (LL: Log likelihood = -7045.259) in random effects ordered probit model, whereas it was smaller 
(Log likelihood = -7233.246) in the ordered probit model. Therefore, the Tunisian sample indicates that the taking into 
account of the heterogeneity of the individuals in general improves the explanatory power of the models. However, in the 
Tunisian sample we did not find improvement of pseudo-R
2
 in the random effects ordered probit model (pseudo-R
2
=1.89%) compared to the ordered probit model(pseudo-R
2
=2.81   
                                                 
8
this result is also found at the time of the regression probit ordered 
9
Pour more detail sweats the ordered probit model to see appendix B 
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In addition, we will see how the significance of the explanatory variables is affected by the unobservable heterogeneity of the 
individuals. Thus, we compare the results of the regressions in the sample, of the ordered probit model and random effects 
ordered probit model, we note that the random effects ordered probit model weakens the significance of many explanatory 
variables. On the other hand, the signs of all the explanatory variables remain unchanged. Precisely, in the regression with 
random effects, we have completly lost the significance with the conventional threshold of 10% of the explanatory variables 
"age3", "matri5", "ecoclim1", "ecoclim2", "ecoclim3", "ecoclim4", "invbehave1" and "investstyle4", respectively 
corresponding to the individuals whose age is between 40 and 55 years, the divorced individuals, with the individuals who 
think that the economic climate in three years will be definitely better or a little better or about the same one, or less good, 
with the individuals who think that the council of a specialist in investment significant whole and with the individuals who 
accept the moderate fluctuations. However, the level significance of the variables "matri1" and "obj9" dropped, while passing 
respectively from 1% to 10%, and 1% to 5%. The only variables whose level of significance improved at the time of the 
regression for random purposes are "Addmult1" and "lambdaMult" corresponding respectively to the transformations of 
additive lotteries and the scale effects multiplicative, whose thresholds passed respectively from 10% to 5% and 5% to 1%. 
Lastly, the level of significance of the remainder of the variables did not change.  
4. VARIANCE ANALYSIS OF THE RANDOM EFFECTS 
In order to understand the factors influencing on the risk aversion of the individuals, we carry out a variance analysis on the 
random effects ordered probit model. This section treat the second objective of our article: we try to determine if the 
inequality in risk aversion in the context of the financial investments is following differences will within or between individual. 
Our analysis consists of a decomposition of the variance of the variable dependent on individual risk aversion, in within 
individual and between-individual components of the observable and unobservable components.  
Precisely, by applying a discrete choice model, namely random effects orderedprobit model, we present a method to 
consider the within individual and the between-individual components of the variance explained and not explained individual 
risk aversion in the context of financial investment. This decomposition aims to study the stability of the individuals risk 
aversion of a series with another, by analyzing within-individual variability. We call:  
Component of the within-individual variance: the within-individual contribution of the latent variable of risk aversion by those 
of the explanatory variables, and   
Component of the between-individual variance: the between-individual contribution of the latent variable of risk aversion 
explained by that of the explanatory variables.  
4.1 Results of the variance analysis 
We study if the inequality in aversion with risk in the context of financial investments is following differences within or 
between individual. By estimating a random effects orderedprobit model, we apply a simple method to estimate the within 
andthe between individuals components of the explained and not explained risk aversion variance. For our empirical 
analysis, we use the base of the data collected at the time of the experimental laboratory led in Tunisia during the time 
between February and April 2012.   
We measure the inequality in risk aversion of the investors by making a variance analysis, according to following stages’:  
 we start by calculating the value considered linear of the latent variable for each observation of the 
Tunisian sample  
 ˆˆ
ikikTN
XY 

 .   
 
Variable Nbr 
d’obs 
Mean Stand-Deviation Min Max  
linearPanelTUN 3833  0.983  0.431  -0.209  2.596  
 
Statistical summary of the variable linearPanelTUN 
 
1. Then, we calculate the average of its estimated values ˆ
iTNY

 for each individual i  and we generate a 
new variable ˆ ˆ ˆ
d
ikTN ikTN iTNY Y Y
 
  . The new variable ˆ
d
ikTNY  is thus a measurement of heterogeneity within 
individual for an individual i  in the Tunisian sample.  
 
 
 
 
Variable Nbrobs Mean Stand-Deviation Min Max  
YikdTN 3833  4.47e-11  0.235  -0.443  0.605   
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Statistical summary of the variable YikdTN 
 
 
Variable Nbrobs Mean Stand-Deviation Min Max  
YiTN 3965  0.983  0.361  0.035  2.102   
 
Statistical summary of the variable YiTN 
 
 
A last stage consists in calculating, the variances of ˆ
iTNY

et ˆ
d
ikTNY :  
ˆ( ) 0 131
iTN
V Y

  is the explained between-individual variance,  
ˆ( ) 0 055
d
ikTN
V Y   is the explained within-individual variance,   
2( ) 0 369i uV u   
10
is the non-explained variance of the between-individual component,  
( ) 1ikV   is the non-explained variance of the within-individual component.  
 
The total variance is :
* *ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1.556
d
ik iikTN iTN ikTN
V V V V V uY Y Y       
 
4.2 Interpretation 
 
We note according to the table (5) which the fraction of the explained variance is much weaker than that not explained 
(11.98% against 87.99%) in the random effects orderedprobit formulation in the sample. This suggests that variation of the 
risk aversion of individuals is probably not explained by the observable characteristics. Therefore, in the variance analysis 
with the random effects orderedprobit model, we explain only 11.98% of the original variance of the sample, which is a rather 
good result.   
In addition, the majority of the explained variance must with the between-individual component with 8.42%. Indeed, the 
weight of the explained within-individual component is 3.56, whereas the percentage of the between-individual explained 
variance is 8.42%. Concerning the not explained part of the original variance, we find that the within-individual variance is 
64.28% much higher, with the between-individual variance of 23.73%. These results show that the inequalities of the risk 
aversion between individual (between-individual exp + between individual not exp = 8.42% + 23.73%=32.15%) are less 
significant than those within-individual individuals (within-individuals.  
exp+within-individuals.nonexp=3.56%+64.28%=67.84%).  
In conclusion, we explained approximately 12% of the original variance and we found that it mainly had within and 
between-individual difference. However, overall the inequality in the risk aversion must mainly be concerned with the 
difference within individual. From where, the non-stability of the answers of the individuals of a series of lottery to another. 
However, like the within-individual variance, is that relating to the stability of the answers of the individuals of a series of 
lottery to another, we can say that a significant component of the variability of the risk aversion must go with the variability of 
the answers of the individuals through the series of lotteries. However, component within individual not explained is more 
significant than that explained in the sample. Consequently, there is no stability of the answers of the individuals of one 
series to the other.  
CONCLUSION 
The study of risk aversion in the behaviors of financial investments occupies a dominating place in the theoretical and 
empirical recent literature. In our work, we tried to quantify its importance and to determine its constitutive factors. Indeed, 
ifthe analysis of the financial products were largely treated, the analysis of the attitude of the investor in particular his 
psychological aptitude to take risks, remains little exploited. In order to give an account of certain deviations compared to the 
theory of expected utility, we introduced individual heterogeneity. Indeed, the same individual confronted with identical 
conditions answers differently, the same questions during different occasions. The classical theory of expected utility is not 
able togive an account of this simple observation. We can argue that these variations of behaviors can be considered as 
errors, present in any data acquisition. This taking into account of the errors, from the start at the theoretical level, seemed 
significant. The importance of this extension lies in the fact that it applies as well to the model of expected utility as with the 
non-expected utility model. With an aim of controlling this individual heterogeneity, we used for our estimates the random 
effects ordered probit model. Indeed, there is an unobserved heterogeneity of the population tastes: the parameters of the 
variables are not invariants with the individual sampled.  
Initially, we tested and controlled the heterogeneity of the individuals in the sample. We showed that there is heterogeneity 
                                                 
10
According to the table (5), 
2
21
0 270u
u




   , then 2 0 270
1 0 270
0 3698u

 
   . 
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between the individuals well. In addition, a narrow examination of the estimates through these models proved that, contrary 
to the shared results, the control of the random effects in general has little effect on the estimates and their significance. 
Indeed, by comparing this model, the risk aversion correctly estimated proved that the models consideringenvisage better 
the choice of the investor at the time of the regression ordered probit model that in that for random effects. However, 
log-likelihood is improved during the estimate for random effects.  
In the second time, we tried to measure the inequality of the risk aversion of the individuals, by carrying out a variance 
analysis on the random effects orderedprobit model. We presented a method allowing measuring the components of 
between and within individual of the risk aversion. Indeed, understand the relative importance of the differences well within 
and between individual of the risk aversion is crucial, be given their impact on the choices of the individual. However, we 
know little on the magnitudes relating to the inequalities in the within and between individual of the risk aversion. According 
to the variance analysis, we showed that the differences between the variances between and within individual are significant. 
In addition, this, since we found that the inequality in the risk aversion must mainly with the difference within individual.  
According to the variance analysis, we found that our model explains 12% of original variance of the risk aversion. The 
differences between the variances between and within individual are significant. Since we found that, the inequality in the 
risk aversion must mainly with the difference within individual. However, the within-individual components are more 
significant in the sample for the variance observed and less significant in the sample for the variance not observed. We can 
say that the within-individual variance must mainly with the not explained component. In addition, the share of the variance of 
the risk aversion had with the component of the between-individual variance in the sample is 32.14%.   
Overall, we showed that the inequality in risk aversion in the within-individual component were much more significant than 
those between individual. However, like the within-individual component variance, is that relating to the stability of the 
answers of the individuals of a series of lottery to another, we could affirm that a significant component of the variability of the 
risk aversion must with the variability of the answers of the individuals through the series of lotteries. However, it should be 
noted that the non-explained within-individual component is more significant than that explained. While, the explained 
component of the variance, must mainly with the between-individual variance. In addition, the techniques of the discrete 
choice models make it possible to test certain refinements of the expected utility theory. And this, by putting the same 
individuals in the similar from the point of view of theory of traditional expected utility, but appreciably different situations. 
Thus, according to the ideas of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), we find indications of non-derivability of the utility function 
around zero. Therefore, individuals are more risk averse in the losses. This deviation will be the subject of an extension of 
this article.  
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Appendices A 
Series 7 and 8 "weak 
probability of large loss"  
Probability of the 
mnimum 
Numbers "min"  Nombre "max"   
 0.5  1  200   
 1  1  99   
 3  3  97   
 6  6  94   
 9  9  91   
 13  13  87   
 17  17  83   
 
Table 1. Table of renumeration of the lotteries with weak probability of large loss  
 
Series 9 and 10 "weak 
probability of Jackpot"  
Probability of the 
mnimum 
Numbers "min"  Nombre "max"   
 85  85  15   
 88  88  12   
 90  90  10   
 92  92  8   
 93  93  7   
 94  94  6   
 95  95  5   
 
Table 2. Table of renumeration of the lotteries with weak probability of jackpot  
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Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N 
yordC 4.101  (2.693)  1  8  3867  
Indicatrice femme  0.489  (0.5)  0  1  4001  
agesuperieur 25 ans et inferieur ou egal a 40 ans  0.301  (0.459)  0  1  4001  
agesuperieur a 40 ans et inferieur ou egal a 55 
ans  
0.061  (0.239)  0  1  4001  
agesuperieur a 55 ans  0.011  (0.104)  0  1  4001  
matrimony==Marie avec contrat  0.189  (0.392)  0  1  4001  
matrimony==Divorce  0.011  (0.104)  0  1  4001  
matrimony==Veuf  0.002  (0.05)  0  1  4001  
en couple non marie  0.064  (0.245)  0  1  4001  
ecoclim==Nettement meilleur  0.124  (0.33)  0  1  3977  
ecoclim==Un peu meilleur  0.396  (0.489)  0  1  3977  
ecoclim==A peu pres le meme 0.284  (0.451)  0  1  3977  
ecoclim==Moins bon  0.178  (0.383)  0  1  3977  
investorbehave==Pas du tout important  0.017  (0.128)  0  1  3989  
investorbehave==Un peu important  0.163  (0.37)  0  1  3989  
investorbehave==Important  0.449  (0.498)  0  1  3989  
investstyle==Aucune  0.088  (0.284)  0  1  4001  
investstyle==Courte Duree 0.28  (0.449)  0  1  4001  
investstyle==Moderee 0.534  (0.499)  0  1  4001  
addmult==A  0.596  (0.491)  0  1  4001  
lambdaAdd 0.062  (0.074)  0  0.31  4001  
lambdaMult 0.044  (0.068)  0  0.26  4001  
lottype== 1.0000  0.324  (0.468)  0  1  4001  
lottype== 2.0000  0.309  (0.462)  0  1  4001  
lottype== 3.0000  0.184  (0.387)  0  1  4001  
maintarget==Securite 0.111  (0.314)  0  1  4001  
maintarget== Revenus a terme  0.179  (0.384)  0  1  4001  
maintarget==Maison  0.201  (0.401)  0  1  4001  
maintarget==Biens durables  0.132  (0.338)  0  1  4001  
 
 
Table 3: Statistical summary of the Tunisian sample 
 
 
 
 
 
Range j Choice Sample %   
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1 RRR  29.09   
2 RRS  9.80  
3 RSR  7.76   
4 RSS  9.34  
5 SRR  9.78  
6 SRS  6.90   
7 SSR  8.20   
8 SSS  19.14  
 
Table 4. Recapitulation of the choices distributions  
 
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
 
Equation 1 : eq1   
 
Indicatrice femme  
0.007  (0.071)  
agesuperieur 25 ans et inferieur ou egal a 40 ans  0.318*** (0.096)  
agesuperieur a 40 ans et inferieur ou egal a 55 ans  0.286  (0.191)  
agesuperieur a 55 ans  -0.262  (0.474)  
matrimony==Marie avec contrat  -0.235* (0.125)  
matrimony==Divorce  -0.527  (0.488)  
matrimony==Veuf  -0.284  (0.575)  
en couple non marie  0.168  (0.143)  
ecoclim==Nettement meilleur  0.349  (0.279)  
ecoclim==Un peu meilleur  0.432  (0.268)  
ecoclim==A peu pres le meme 0.295  (0.269)  
ecoclim==Moins bon  0.335  (0.271)  
investorbehave==Pas du tout important  -0.317  (0.293)  
investorbehave==Un peu important  0.073  (0.109)  
investorbehave==Important  0.019  (0.080)  
investstyle==Aucune  0.961*** (0.163)  
investstyle==Courte Duree 0.508*** (0.136)  
investstyle==Moderee 0.162  (0.126)  
addmult==A  0.145** (0.069)  
lambdaAdd 0.817** (0.359)  
lambdaMult 1.295*** (0.450)  
lottype== 1.0000  0.087  (0.057)  
lottype== 2.0000  0.282*** (0.057)  
lottype== 3.0000  0.625*** (0.059)  
maintarget==Securite -0.531*** (0.123)  
maintarget== Revenus a terme  -0.312*** (0.102)  
maintarget==Maison  -0.238** (0.097)  
maintarget==Biens durables  -0.331*** (0.113)  
Equation 2 : _cut1   
Intercept 0.324  (0.300)  
Equation 3 : _cut2   
Intercept 0.650** (0.300)  
Equation 4 : _cut3   
Intercept 0.890*** (0.300)  
Equation 5 : _cut4   
Intercept 1.176*** (0.300)  
Equation 6 : _cut5   
Intercept 1.488*** (0.300)  
Equation 7 : _cut6   
Intercept 1.725*** (0.300)  
Equation 8 : _cut7   
Intercept 2.052*** (0.301)  
Equation 9 : rho   
Intercept 0.241*** (0.021)  
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Number of observation  3833  
Number of individuals (383)  
Log-likelihood -7045.259  
X
2
(28) 271.438  
Variance (B : Between, W : Within, T : Total)  
B explained (% B exp / T Total)  0.131(8.42%)  
W explained (% W exp / T Total) 0.055(3.56%)  
B non-explained (% B non exp / T Total) 0.369(23.72%)  
W non-explained (% W non exp / T Total) 1(64.27%)  
Levels of significance : * : 10%          **: 5% ***: 1%   
 
Table 5: Results of the estimate of the random effects ordered probit model 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
 
Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
ConsTN -0.290* (0.168)  
femme  -0.009  (0.036)  
homme catégorie de référence  catégorie de référence  
age1  catégorie de référence  catégorie de référence  
age2  0.261*** (0.050)  
age3  0.238** (0.098)  
age4  -0.215  (0.286)  
matri1 -0.187*** (0.065)  
matri5  -0.498* (0.257)  
matri7  catégorie de référence  catégorie de référence  
matri6  -0.239  (0.430)  
Matri8  0.101  (0.074)  
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ecoclim1  0.286* (0.148)  
ecoclim2  0.346** (0.143)  
ecoclim3  0.250* (0.144)  
ecoclim4  0.271* (0.145)  
ecoclim5 catégorie de référence  catégorie de référence  
invbehave1  -0.419*** (0.144)  
invbehave2  0.043  (0.055)  
invbehave3  0.018  (0.042)  
invbehave4 catégorie de référence  catégorie de référence  
investstyle2  0.839*** (0.085)  
investstyle3  0.449*** (0.068)  
investstyle4  0.179*** (0.064)  
investstyle5  catégorie de référence  catégorie de référence  
addmult1 0.117* (0.067)  
addmult2  catégorie de référence  catégorie de référence  
lambdaAdd 0.810** (0.346)  
lambdaMult 1.101** (0.430)  
lottype2  0.091  (0.056)  
lottype3  0.268*** (0.055)  
lottype4  0.565*** (0.057)  
lottype5  catégorie de référence  catégorie de référence  
obj6  -0.420*** (0.061)  
obj7  -0.230*** (0.052)  
obj9  -0.173*** (0.050)  
obj10  -0.235*** (0.058)  
cut1 0.290* (0.168)  
cut2 0.577*** ( 0.1683)  
cut3 0.788*** ( 0.168)  
cut4 1.038*** (0.168)  
cut5 1.311*** (0.168)  
cut6 1.519*** (0.169)   
cut7 1.809*** (0.169)   
 
N  3833  
Log-likelihood -7233.246  
 418.868  
Levels of significance : * : 10%  ** : 5%  *** : 1%  
 
Table 6: Results of the estimate of the ordered probit model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
